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CIRCLING AROUND THE CONFRONTATION 
CLAUSE: REDEFINED REACH BUT NOT A 
ROBUST RIGHT 
Lisa Kern Griffin*† 
The Supreme Court’s consolidated ruling in United States v. Davis and 
United States v. Hammon is a classic of the genre of consensus opinions to 
which the Roberts Court aspired in its first, transitional term. The opinion, 
authored by Justice Scalia, contains practical accommodations unusual in a 
decision by the Court’s fiercest proponent of first principles. The restraint 
that characterized the term is, of course, more about considerations of logis-
tics (including the desire to avoid re-arguments after the mid-term 
replacement of Justice O’Connor) than about the alignment of logic. Be-
cause it reflects temporary institutional constraints rather than intellectual 
agreement, the much-talked-of consensus, already less evident in the final 
decisions of the term, will decline further in the term to come. But Davis 
was considered and decided at a cultural moment when non-unanimous de-
cisions were closely watched, and dissent was taken as a signal that the 
majority opinions somehow carried less precedential weight. Because com-
promise was not only the aspiration but also the expectation, Justice Scalia 
found himself engaged in strategic and incremental decision-making, in an 
attempt to count to nine instead of five. That attempt narrowed the class of 
cases in which confrontation rights will apply. Whether, in those cases, the 
right will have meaningful content depends in part on the Court’s next steps 
with regard to the requirement of cross-examination itself. 
Davis concerns the scope of the renewed right to confrontation an-
nounced in United States v. Crawford and the extent to which statements to 
law enforcement fit within the definition of “testimonial.” The Court was 
unanimous in ruling in Davis (with Justice Thomas’s concurrence in the 
judgment only) that a 911 call seeking emergency assistance did not produce 
the kind of testimonial statements with which the Confrontation Clause is 
concerned. And in Hammon the Court held, in an 8-1 decision from which 
Justice Thomas dissented, that statements to police officers investigating a 
crime on the scene are testimonial in the absence of an ongoing emergency. 
The test the Court announced focuses on the purpose of the questioning by 
law enforcement, viewed through an “objective” lens. Statements are non-
testimonial, even when made in the course of police interrogation, if made 
“under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” 
                                                                                                                      
* Lecturer in Law, UCLA School of Law 
† Suggested citation: Lisa Kern Griffin, Circling around the Confrontation Clause: Rede-
fined Reach but not a Robust Right, 105 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 16 (2006), 
http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/griffin.pdf. 
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Such statements are “testimonial when the circumstances objectively indi-
cate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose 
of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to 
later criminal prosecution.”  
This formulation of testimonial closely resembles the “emergency re-
sponse” test advanced by the federal government in the briefing and 
argument. The test did not find much favor with the members of the Court in 
the course of the argument, and the decision thus serves as a reminder that 
reading the tarot cards of oral argument is never a safe bet. It also raises the 
question of how the Court’s thinking evolved between oral argument and the 
decision, or for that matter between the categorical approach to testimonial 
taken in Crawford and the pragmatic working definition that emerged from 
Davis. The answer lies at least in part in Justice Scalia’s desire to assemble 
the votes to definitively overrule Ohio v. Roberts, which most lower courts 
had continued to apply to nontestimonial statements post-Crawford.  
The Court buried the lede, but Davis does pronounce Roberts dead. Ac-
cording to the opinion, testimonial statements are not merely the “core” but 
also the “perimeter” of the category of prior statements that implicate the 
Confrontation Clause. And, in a footnote and an aside at the end of the opin-
ion, the Court uses the magic words and states that Crawford “overruled” 
Roberts, something only the two Crawford dissenters (Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor) had been willing to say at the time. The 
“unpardonable vice” of Roberts’s reliability analysis was so antithetical to 
Justice Scalia’s view of the Confrontation Clause that the opportunity to 
dispense with it may have made him compliant at the margins about the test 
articulated to take its place. 
The Court had to grapple, as well, with the application of Crawford’s 
uncompromising reasoning to the realities of messy human situations like 
domestic violence. The span of just two years that separates the promulga-
tion of the testimonial standard from its testing in the context of 911 calls 
compresses the usual course of constitutional analysis. It is rarely the same 
Court, and often not even the same generation, that draws the lines when 
exigent situations call for after-market modifications of constitutional rights. 
The Court’s effort here has to be considered a first pass. Rather than adopt 
any of the formulations that had evolved in the lower courts, the Supreme 
Court acknowledged a spectrum of nontestimonial emergency responses but 
did not identify a clear endpoint, such as the identification of the attacker or 
the arrival of the police on the scene. Important considerations cited by the 
Court include the nature of the information (whether it concerns past facts 
or ongoing activity), the necessity of law enforcement’s questions, and the 
formality of the inquiry, but none of those factors is dispositive. The assail-
ant in Davis was in retreat, but the Court still deemed his identification to 
the 911 operator nontestimonial. An unspecified amount of aftermath ques-
tioning will thus escape the testimonial label, and statements made in the 
course of protracted emergencies like kidnappings might as well. The opin-
ion also fails to account for the possibility that law enforcement will simply 
manage investigations in order to maximize admissible statements. And it is 
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too facile to suggest a clear distinction between statements about what “is 
happening” and what “has happened,” when the latter is almost always nec-
essary to explain the former.  
Davis also narrows Crawford considerably, and perhaps inadvertently. 
Although interrogation itself was not defined, the Crawford Court stated that 
“[w]hatever else [testimonial] covers,” it applies to “police interrogations.” 
And the Court sounded a particularly categorical note about this aspect of 
the definition, repeating that statements from interrogations would be testi-
monial “under even a narrow standard” and that “interrogations by law 
enforcement officers fall squarely within that class.” Davis adds an “except 
when,” not by defining interrogation itself, but by actually contracting the 
definition of testimonial. The Davis Court says that it is determining “which 
police interrogations produce testimony” and adds that “in some circum-
stances” interrogations “tend to generate testimonial responses.” Now, 
instead of the endpoint of the inquiry, interrogation is the baseline from 
which courts begin to examine whether a statement is testimonial. Crawford 
can be read, and Davis could have been decided, to hold that all accusations 
to government agents that a person committed a crime are testimonial. But 
now some accusations—those that are the product of unstructured interac-
tions in emergency situations—fall outside that category. 
Furthermore, Davis may burden defendants with demonstrating the ab-
sence of an emergency. George Fisher has described the Davis definition as 
an “only-purpose” test: To the extent that there is an exigent situation that 
interrogation helps somehow to resolve, law enforcement’s “primary” pur-
pose is unlikely to be proving past facts, or at least that is a very difficult 
argument to make. Davis expressly sets aside the question whether state-
ments made outside of the law enforcement context can be testimonial, but 
this primary-purpose test is a model that could be exported. Its logic would 
seem to apply as well to statements whose primary purpose is to seek medi-
cal treatment, even where medical personnel are asking questions that also 
gather investigative details. Likewise, Davis could shorten Crawford’s reach 
in another category of cases where it has had high impact: statements made 
by victims of child abuse to their parents. As Fisher points out, parents’ de-
sire to put an end to abuse and seek help for their child will always be a 
sufficient purpose to trigger questioning, so a child’s statements in this con-
text may well be deemed nontestimonial, even if they are relayed to 
authorities as well.  
Chief Justice Roberts has publicly avowed his desire to achieve unanim-
ity through narrow rulings offering “clarity and guidance.” In Davis, the 
decision is narrow and consensus was largely achieved, but the end result is 
not particularly clear. Stating seven times in the opinion that it is an “objec-
tive” test does not make it so. And declaring that “testimonial statements are 
what they are” helps the lower courts not one whit when they actually have 
to determine where the lines are drawn. Ironically, the Davis formulation is 
a totality of the circumstances test in many ways more similar to the Roberts 
reliability inquiry than the bright lines of Crawford.  
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But setting aside the unanswered questions and unintended conse-
quences, the Davis decision does craft a reasonable compromise between 
two competing extremes. The broad reading of Crawford would draw the 
line at accusations of any stripe; the narrowest reading is limited to “formal-
ized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions.” Justice Scalia had joined Justice Thomas’s concurrence in 
White v. Illinois, advancing the latter definition. In Davis, however, Justice 
Scalia declared that “[r]estricting the Confrontation Clause to the precise 
forms against which it was originally directed is a recipe for its extinction.” 
Of course, Justice Scalia often takes the view that the Constitution should be 
interpreted to mean precisely what it originally meant. But this is a case that 
splits the hair separating the consequence of Justice Scalia’s “faint-hearted” 
originalism from the effect of Justice Thomas’s dogged intentionalism. It is 
also a case in which Justice Scalia—after sniping at oral argument that 
“[m]aybe we should just suspend the Confrontation Clause in spousal abuse 
cases”—acknowledges in the opinion that domestic violence is “notoriously 
susceptible to intimidation or coercion of the victim to ensure that she does 
not testify at trial.” The net result of those shifts is a purposive test. It has the 
virtue of focusing on the intention of law enforcement and therefore on the 
potential abuse of state power.  
With that aversion to inquisitorial methods and concern about govern-
ment manipulation of out-of-court statements in mind, the Court should now 
give content to the cross-examination right itself. Having exerted itself de-
ciding when the Confrontation Clause applies, the Court has failed to notice 
that applying it does not mean much. Crawford and Davis both left un-
changed the rule of California v. Green: The Confrontation Clause permits 
the use of prior testimonial statements where the declarant either appears for 
cross-examination at trial, or is unavailable to testify but has been subject to 
a prior opportunity for cross-examination by the defendant. In United States 
v. Owens, the Court held that a witness has “appeared” for cross-
examination and vindicated the Confrontation Clause right when he has 
been placed on the stand and under oath, and has responded willingly to 
questions (i.e., not invoked a privilege or been held in contempt), even if he 
has no memory of the underlying facts, and minimal information about the 
circumstances surrounding the prior statement. In the lower courts, Owens 
has led to the conclusion that total denial of making a prior statement or of 
its substance still affords a constitutionally adequate basis for cross-
examination; that memory lapse (feigned or real) has no bearing on avail-
ability for cross-examination; and that, as in Vaska v. Alaska, a witness who 
“could not shed any light on whether the incident about which the statement 
was made occurred, whether she made the statement, or the circumstances 
under which she made the statement” appeared for cross-examination within 
the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.  
These decisions are often justified with the truism that the Constitution 
guarantees an opportunity to cross-examine but not successful cross-
examination itself. But many cases make reference to the “opportunity for 
effective cross-examination,” including Green and Owens. To be sure, effec-
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tiveness itself is not required, but the chance to question (even if it is an op-
portunity missed or inartfully pursued) is the constitutional baseline. And to 
afford such an opportunity, a witness must demonstrate what Robert 
Mosteller has called “minimal testimonial adequacy.”  
The Court’s focus, however, has been on the hollow formalism of physi-
cal presence. Justice Scalia recently dropped a hint that he may take aim at 
another Confrontation Clause opinion with which he has long and vigor-
ously disagreed: Maryland v. Craig. In Craig, a child abuse victim was 
permitted to testify by one-way closed-circuit television. Because the child 
was under oath, cross-examination was contemporaneous, and the jury 
could observe the witness’s demeanor, the Court found that the purposes of 
confrontation were served. In the United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez decision 
this term (an otherwise unrelated case affirming a defendant’s right to 
choose paid counsel), Justice Scalia reiterated his disagreement with Craig 
and underscored his victory over Roberts, criticizing, as Richard Friedman 
noted on his Confrontation Blog, the “unrestrained functional approach” of 
both cases. But Justice Scalia’s single-minded attention to face-to-face con-
frontation has neglected the substance of adequate cross-examination. The 
“main and essential purpose,” as the Court stated in Davis v. Alaska, “means 
more than being allowed to confront the witness physically.”  
Looking a defendant in the eye—or perhaps more importantly allowing 
the jury an opportunity to look a witness in the eye—is an important ele-
ment of the confrontation right, but it is not sufficient to satisfy the 
requirement of cross-examination. If a witness were to walk into court, sit in 
the witness chair, and look the defendant straight in the eye while invoking 
the Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify, everyone would agree that the 
defendant had been deprived of her constitutional right to cross-examine. In 
cases of hybrid witnesses, neither wholly unavailable nor wholly available, 
who are physically present in the courtroom but remote, recanting, or recal-
citrant, looking the witness in the eye does not accomplish much either, 
because there is nothing behind the eyes to confront. It is quite difficult to 
conduct an effective examination of a hostile witness who is no longer hos-
tile, but has previously made statements to your detriment.  
As the Court continues to circle around the meaning of testimonial, it 
should also ensure that testimonial statements are in turn subject to constitu-
tionally adequate cross-examination. Richard Friedman has reproached the 
Court for its “longstanding unwillingness to recognize that a party may be 
substantially hindered in attempting to examine a witness with respect to a 
prior statement the truth of which the witness no longer affirms.” If the 
Court is poised now to strengthen the requirement of face-to-face confronta-
tion, it is incoherent to do so without ensuring that the defendant will obtain 
some answers to his questions in the process. The salient fact of Owens, 
ignored by the lower court extensions of the holding, is that the witness in 
that case had a clear memory of at least one thing: the prior identification of 
the defendant. The witness did not, as would have been preferable, remem-
ber the circumstances surrounding the statement, but that gave the testimony 
a self-impeaching quality. Owens is a sub-floor on which to build a mean-
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ingful but still workable requirement. While it does not exactly comport 
with Crawford’s ideal of the “crucible of cross-examination,” a witness has 
been confronted within the meaning of the Clause if she at least acknowl-
edges making the prior statement, which would permit some infirmities to 
be probed and the hearsay to be impeached. The goal of confrontation, ac-
cording to Crawford’s reasoning and Davis’s purposive test, is to expose any 
governmental coercion or manipulation. But total evasion with regard to the 
production of a prior testimonial statement leaves the hearsay freestanding 
and unchallenged; it does not discharge the defendant’s right to cross-
examination. If physical presence alone truly meets the standard then the 
reinvigorated Confrontation Clause has reach but no force.  
